Abstract. Some promising recent schemes for XML access control employ encryption for implementing security policies on published data, avoiding data duplication. In this article, we study one such scheme, due to Miklau and Suciu [2003]. That scheme was introduced with some intuitive explanations and goals, but without precise definitions and guarantees for the use of cryptography (specifically, symmetric encryption and secret sharing). We bridge this gap in the present work. We analyze the scheme in the context of the rigorous models of modern cryptography. We obtain formal results in simple, symbolic terms close to the vocabulary of Miklau and Suciu. We also obtain more detailed computational results that establish security against probabilistic polynomial-time adversaries. Our approach, which relates these two layers of the analysis, continues a recent thrust in security research and may be applicable to a broad class of systems that rely on cryptographic data protection.
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[2004], Laud [2004] , and Micciancio and Warinschi [2004] ). Concretely, the gap means that the protection semantics leaves many problematic issues unresolved. We describe two such issues, as examples: -Partial Information: It is conceivable that even when a node should be hidden according to a protection, the partially encrypted document may in fact leak some information about the data in that node. -Encryption Cycles: From the point of view of the abstract semantics, encryption cycles (such as encrypting a key with itself) are legitimate and do not contradict security. On the other hand, there are encryption algorithms that satisfy standard cryptographic definitions of security but that leak keys when encryption cycles are created (see Section 4).
More generally, there are many encryption methods and many notions of security for them (e.g., Bellare and Rogaway [2005] , Dolev et al. [2000] , and Goldwasser and Micali [1984] ), and it is not clear which one, if any, provides adequate guarantees for this application-nor is it exactly clear what those guarantees might be. The immediate goal of this work is to bridge this gap by reconciling the abstract semantics of protections with a more concrete, computational treatment of security, and to define and establish precise security guarantees. We do not wish to replace the abstract semantics, which certainly has its place, but rather to complement it.
From a broader perspective, our goal is to develop, apply, and promote useful concepts and tools for security analysis in the field of database theory. These concepts and tools do not pertain to statistical techniques, which have long been known in database research (e.g., Adam and Worthmann [1989] , Castano et al. [1995] , and Ullman [1983] ), but rather to cryptography. While sophisticated uses of cryptology in database research may have been of modest scope, there is an obvious need for database security, and we believe that cryptology has much to offer. In research on cryptographic protocols, formal and complexity-theoretic methods have been successful in providing detailed models and in enabling security proofs (sometimes automated ones). The same methods are beneficial for a broad class of systems that require security (e.g., Micciancio and Panjwani [2006] ). Each application, however, can necessitate nontrivial, specific insights and results. In the techniques that we study, partial and multiple encryptions occur in (large, XML) data instances; we therefore depart from the situations most typically considered in the cryptography literature, towards data management. It is this specificity that motivates the present article.
1.1. OVERVIEW OF RESULTS. Our analysis is directed at the core of the framework of Miklau and Suciu, which aims to ensure data protection by an interesting combination of encryption schemes and secret sharing schemes [Shamir 1979] .
As a formal counterpart to their loose, informal concept of data secrecy, we introduce a strong, precise cryptographic definition. The definition goes roughly as follows. Consider a protection for an XML document. An adversary is given an arbitrary set of keys, and the liberty of selecting two instantiations for the data in all nodes that occur in the XML document. The only restriction on these instantiations is that they should coincide on the nodes to which the adversary rightfully has access according to its keys and the abstract semantics of protections. In other words, the adversary selects two documents that contain the same information in the nodes it can access but may differ elsewhere. Then the adversary is given the partially encrypted document that corresponds to one of its two documents, and its goal is to decide which of the two instantiations was used in generating this partially encrypted document. Security means that the adversary cannot do much better than picking at random. It implies that the partially encrypted document reveals no information on the data in the nodes that should be hidden from the adversary, for otherwise this information would be sufficient to determine which instantiation was used.
Technically, we adapt and extend the approach of Abadi and Rogaway [2002] , which has been followed and developed in several pieces of recent work (e.g., Laud [2004] and Micciancio and Panjwani [2005, 2006] ). The novelties of this article include the application to document access control, significant differences in basic definitions motivated by this application, and the treatment of secret sharing. First, we provide an intermediate symbolic language for cryptographic expressions. We then define patterns of expressions; intuitively, a pattern represents the information that an expression reveals to an adversary. We show how to transform protections into cryptographic expressions, and use patterns for providing an equivalent semantics for protections. This equivalence is captured in Theorem 1. Going further, we relate expressions to concrete computations on bit-strings. The most difficult result of this article is Theorem 2. Informally, it states that patterns faithfully represent the information that expressions reveal, even when expressions and patterns are implemented with actual encryption schemes (not symbolically). More precisely, we associate probability distributions with an expression and its pattern by mapping symbols to bit-strings and implementing encryption with a semantically secure encryption scheme [Goldwasser and Micali 1984] , and prove that these distributions cannot be distinguished by any probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm. Our main theorem, Theorem 4, reconciles the abstract semantics of protections with the actual use of encryption. We establish that if data is hidden according to a protection, then it is secret according to our definition of secrecy.
1.2. CONTENTS. The next section, Section 2, is mostly a review. Section 3 introduces our formal language for representing cryptographic expressions and defines an alternative semantics of XML protections. Our main results are in Section 4, which gives concrete interpretations to expressions and relates the formal semantics of protections to a strong definition of secrecy. Section 5 considers some variants and extensions. Section 6 concludes. The appendix contains additional proofs.
Controlling Access to XML Documents with Protections
In this section, we briefly recall the key aspects of the work of Miklau and Suciu. We focus on protections. We describe the derivation of partially encrypted documents from protections in the next section. We omit the policy query language because, for our purposes, we can discuss the protections generated from policies rather than the policies themselves.
2.1. XML DOCUMENTS AND PROTECTIONS. We model XML documents as trees labeled with elements from a set Data = {D 1 , D 2 , . . . }, which we assume to represent XML element names and actual data values, though we make no syntactic distinction between these two possibilities. We treat D 1 , D 2 , . . . as atomic data symbols. We use pre-order representations for XML trees, described
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with terminals in Data ∪ {"(", ")"}.
A protection consists of two components: a metadata XML tree obtained from an XML tree by adding metadata nodes, and a mapping that attaches to each node a positive Boolean formula over Keys = {K 1 , K 2 , . . . }. Metadata nodes are nodes that have special kinds of labels, and it is assumed that they can be distinguished from the standard XML nodes. Their labels are one of the symbols OR and AND, or hold keys in the set Keys or key shares in the set KeyShares defined by:
.n for a fixed parameter n. Thus, in summary, protections are generated by the grammar:
is the set of node labels.
Roughly, the key shares
are pieces of information that together allow the recovery of the key K i , but of which no proper subset suffices for computing K i , or even nontrivial partial information about K i . For example, the key shares K with K i . We treat a framework more general than the original one, which uses a particular way of sharing keys. We assume that the number of shares for each key is some integer constant n (with n ≥ 2), and that each key is shared only once. (This assumption holds in the original framework, where n = 2.)
In a protection, the formula that guards a node describes a condition that needs to be satisfied before a user is granted access to that node (and its children). For example, accessing a node guarded by the formula K 1 ∧ (K 2 ∨ K 3 ) requires having key K 1 and at least one of the keys K 2 and K 3 . In addition, the user should also satisfy all formulas on the path from the root to the node. Figure 1 gives an example (adapted from Miklau and Suciu [2003] ). The tree at the top is an example of a protection over some XML medical database. Notice that we preserved the original labels-we did not replace element names with symbols D 1 , D 2 , . . . . A user that possesses only key K 3 cannot access any node since the root is guarded by K 1 . If the user knows also K 1 , then it should be able to access the data in nodes {1, 2, 3, 5}.
2.2. NORMALIZATION. Using simple transformations, one can rewrite any protection into an equivalent, normalized protection where all formulas that guard nodes are atomic, that is, one of true, false, or K for some K ∈ Keys. Normalization requires adding metadata nodes, keys, and key shares. Normalization can also include removing parts guarded by false, so we assume that false does not appear in normalized formulas (departing slightly from the original definition but without loss of generality). Normalized protections are important because, in standard encryption schemes, one can encrypt under an atomic key but not under a Boolean combination of keys. Normalized protections serve as the basis for producing partially encrypted documents by applying an encryption algorithm repeatedly. (See Figure 2. )
In Figure 1 , the tree at the bottom is a normalized protection, equivalent to the protection at the top. In the normalized protection, a user with keys K 1 and K 3 can recover the information in nodes 9 and 10, that is, the key shares K 1 5 and K 2 5 , and therefore K 5 . (Recall that, in Miklau and Suciu [2003] , keys are split into only two shares.) The key K 5 can then be used to recover the information in node 11, that is, the key K 6 which together with K 1 provides access to the nodes {1, 2, 3, 5} of the original tree.
2.3. A SEMANTICS OF PROTECTIONS. Formally, the semantics of a protection P is the function Acc P : P(Keys) → P(Data) that, given a set of keys T ⊆ Keys, returns the set of data that can be accessed using the keys in T . Computing the function Acc P (T ) is an iterative process. The keys in T are used to access new keys (by either obtaining them directly or recovering all their shares), and the process is repeated until a maximal set of keys is obtained. The output of Acc P (T ) is the set of all data contained in nodes that can be accessed using this last set of keys.
We refer the reader to Miklau and Suciu [2003] for additional details on the definition of Acc P (T ). In most of our analysis, we use an equivalent formulation of the formal semantics, given in Section 3.
2.4. ON KEYS DERIVED FROM DATA. In the description above and in the analysis that follows, we do not consider the use of keys derived from data (e.g., from mother's maiden names and social security numbers). There are at least three obstacles to obtaining security guarantees with such keys. These obstacles are not specific to a particular scheme, but they do arise in this context.
-First, the potential lack of entropy in data implies that the resulting keys may offer no security. For example, keys computed from 9-digit social security numbers can have at most 10 9 values, which an attacker may try in order to recover anything encrypted under those keys. An attacker may even learn the underlying social security number when decryption with one of those values succeeds. -Moreover, the key derivations can lose some data entropy. Specifically, Miklau and Suciu compute a 128-bit key by breaking data into 128-bit blocks and XORing those blocks; if a piece of data yields blocks in which only the first m bits are meaningful and the last 128 − m bits contain a fixed pattern, then the resulting key has at most m bits of entropy, no matter how much entropy was initially present in the data. -Finally, the resulting keys can be involved in questionable encryption cyclesfor instance, protecting a mother's maiden name with a social security number and vice versa.
Formal Analysis
In this section we introduce a language for representing cryptographic expressions that use symmetric encryption and secret sharing schemes. We rely on this language for providing a formal account of the transformation of protections into partially encrypted documents. We also define patterns of expressions, which capture the information that expressions reveal to an adversary, in symbolic terms. This definition is a variant of ones suggested in other contexts [Abadi and Rogaway 2002; Herzog 2004; Micciancio and Panjwani 2005] . Finally, we establish a relation between the semantics of protections and these patterns. Basically, expressions are useful as an intermediate language between protections and the world of probability distributions on bit-strings. They also serve as a bridge to other work on formal analysis. That work includes the idea of patterns, as generalizations of expressions. We adapt and extend that idea for the present setting.
3.1. AN INTERMEDIATE CRYPTOGRAPHIC LANGUAGE. We consider expressions built from the set of basic data BData (defined above), using tupling and 6:8 M. ABADI AND B. WARINSCHI encryption with keys in Keys. The grammar for expressions is:
For example, an element in Exp is the expression
It represents the tupling of two ciphertexts. The first ciphertext is the encryption under key K 2 of data D 2 and key share K 2 1 . The second ciphertext is the encryption under key K 1 of the tuple formed from data D 1 and the encryption under key K 3 of key K 2 .
We sometimes omit parentheses in expressions. For example, we may write
3.2. ASSOCIATING CRYPTOGRAPHIC EXPRESSIONS TO PROTECTIONS. We use our language of expressions for giving a precise definition of how to map a normalized protection to (a symbolic representation for) a partially encrypted document. This definition is recursive. It relies on the intuition that each node of the protection under consideration is (recursively) mapped to a part of the final, partially encrypted document. If the node is guarded by a key, then the corresponding part of the final document is encrypted under that key, otherwise it is left in clear.
Formally, we define the function E : Prot → Exp inductively by:
is a normalized protection, B is an arbitrary symbol in BData, and K is an arbitrary key in Keys.
For example, the expression of Figure 2 corresponds to the second protection in Figure 1 , with the element name contained in node i replaced with data symbol D i .
3.3. CYCLES. The definition of expressions allows encryption cycles of the kind discussed in the introduction. For some of our results, it is useful to focus on a class of acyclic expressions:
Definition 1 (Acyclic Expressions). A plain occurrence of a key K j in an expression E 1 is one where K j is not the subscript in a subexpression {. . .
The expression E is acyclic if the graph associated with its "encrypts" relation is acyclic.
For example, {K 1 } K 2 and {{K 1 } K 2 } K 2 are both acyclic expressions, while
As long as data values are not used as keys, a protection P that results from the translation of a policy never contains keys in its nodes. In turn, if normalizing P yields P , then E(P ) is an acyclic expression. (This point follows from the definition of normalization [Miklau and Suciu 2003] .) 3.4. RECOVERABLE KEYS. Given an expression E, we write keys(E) for the set of key symbols that occur in E and key symbols whose shares occur in E. We call a key recoverable if the key occurs in clear (i.e., not encrypted), if the key occurs encrypted under recoverable keys, or if each of its shares occurs in clear or encrypted under recoverable keys. More precisely, a key is recoverable if it is in the least set S of expressions such that:
We write recoverable(E) for the set of all recoverable keys in expression E.
For example, with n = 2, for the expression
we have
while for the expression
For each expression E, we define its structure struct(E). Essentially, the structure of an expression is given by its parse tree in which the labels are replaced with fresh symbols. We therefore introduce D, K 0 , and K j 0 (for j ∈ 1..n), all disjoint from BData, and define the structure of expressions by:
Thus, data symbols are replaced with D, key symbols are replaced with K 0 , and key shares are replaced with corresponding shares of K 0 . For example, the structure of the expression
The encryption cycle in this structure is unimportant for our purposes. Alternative definitions of expression structure can avoid such cycles without affecting our results. (For example, one such definition lets the structure of {E} K i be {struct(E)} K 0 , where K 0 is a fresh symbol distinct from K 0 .)
We write p(E, T ) for the pattern that can be observed in expression E using for decryption the keys in T ⊆ keys(E). The set of patterns is defined like the set of expressions but over extended sets of atomic symbols that include D, K 0 , and K j 0 (for j ∈ 1..n). The pattern p(E, T ) is defined by:
The idea that motivates this definition is that a ciphertext encrypted under an unknown key K i reveals at most the structure of the underlying plaintext and the identity of K i , but not the encrypted value. Section 4 explains a computational counterpart of this idea.
We write pattern(E) for the pattern obtained from E by using for decryption the keys recoverable from E itself. We let:
For example, the pattern of the expression
Similarly, the pattern of the expression
Finally, when n = 2, the pattern of the expression
3.6. SECRECY, SYMBOLICALLY. Using patterns, we characterize the set of visible data (and thus the set of secret data) in formal expressions. By analogy with the definition of Acc P (T ), we define the set of data accessible in expression E with keys in the set {K 1 , K 2 , . . . , K l } ⊆ keys(E) by:
The following theorem relates Acc P (T ) and Acc E (T ), thus justifying the similarity in notation. It states that the set of data that can be accessed with keys K 1 , K 2 , . . . , K l according to protection P is precisely the set of data that can be seen in the pattern of (E(P), K 1 , K 2 , . . . , K l ). The purpose of the tupling with the keys K 1 , K 2 , . . . , K l is to make those keys immediately recoverable.
THEOREM 1. Let P be a normalized protection and T ⊆ keys(E(P)). Then
When T is empty, the theorem holds because Acc P (∅) and Acc E(P) (∅) both consist of the data that occurs only under keys that can be recovered from E(P). More generally, for an arbitrary T , it holds because Acc P (T ) and Acc E(P) (T ) both consist of the data that occurs only under keys that can be recovered from the combination of E(P) and T . We omit a complete proof of this theorem; in the rest of the article, we rely primarily on Acc E (T ) rather than on Acc P (T ).
Computational Analysis
In this section, we give a concrete interpretation for expressions and patterns as probability distributions on bit-strings. This interpretation is computational in the sense that it relies on computations on bit-strings rather than on symbolic expressions. In particular, encryption is an actual computation on bit-strings, rather than a formal operation. In this computational world, we give a cryptographic definition for data secrecy, then prove our main results.
We first recall the definition of computational indistinguishability (a central ingredient for defining cryptographic secrecy) and those of encryption and secret sharing schemes. We use a standard notion of security for encryption: indistinguishability against chosen plaintext attacks (IND-CPA), also known as semantic security [Goldwasser and Micali 1984] . We define it next. For a given encryption scheme = (K, E, D) and a bit b, we consider a "left-right" oracle LR ,b (η). This oracle is a program that generates a key k (via k R ← K(η)), and then answers queries of the form (m 0 , m 1 ), where m 0 and m 1 are bit-strings of equal length. The oracle always returns the answer E(k, m b ), that is, the encryption of the message selected by b. Scheme is said to be IND-CPA secure if for any probabilistic polynomial-time adversary A with access to the oracle described above, the quantity:
INDISTINGUISHABILITY OF DISTRIBUTION ENSEMBLES. Let {D
is negligible as a function of η. The probabilities are induced by the randomness used in the adversary and in the key-generation and encryption processes. Intuitively, the adversary A does not know b a priori, and it aims to discover b. The advantage In accordance with this definition of security, encryption need not hide the length of plaintexts (because m 0 and m 1 are required to be of equal length). Since length may depend on structure, the structure of plaintexts may be revealed as well. Furthermore, encryption need not hide the identity of keys: an adversary may be able to distinguish two encryptions under the same unknown key from two encryptions under different unknown keys. Finally, since the oracles are responsible for generating and using the encryption keys, the adversary cannot guess or invent a key and submit it for encryption under itself; hence, the definition offers no guarantee for such cyclic encryptions, which may therefore leak keys. Alternative notions of security can yield stronger guarantees, but correspondingly they are harder to satisfy. Section 5 considers some such notions.
4.3. SECRET SHARING SCHEMES. An n-out-of-n secret sharing scheme SS = (S, C) for sharing keys of consists of algorithms for share creation and share combination. The randomized share creation algorithm S takes as input a key k and the security parameter η used to generate it, and outputs n shares of k:
. . , k n , and attempts to reconstitute the original key. The scheme is correct if C(S(k, η)) = k for any key k and any η.
Security of secret sharing means that a proper subset of the shares for a key provides no useful information on the key-more precisely, we require that this subset cannot be distinguished from a corresponding subset for another key. Let sh(k) be a sample from the distribution S(k, η) of the n shares output by the sharing algorithm for the key k, and sh(k)| S be the restriction of sh(k) to the indexes in some set of indexes S ⊆ {1, 2, . . . , n}. We require that, for any proper subset of indexes S ⊂ {1, 2, . . . , n} and any probabilistic polynomial-time adversary A, the quantity:
is negligible as a function of η.
While this security requirement does not seem to be well established, it should not be too surprising. Particular schemes may have additional properties, for example that sh(k 0 )| S and sh(k 0 )| S are indistinguishable whenever S and S are proper subsets of indexes of the same size (so key shares may all look alike). We do not need those properties.
COMPUTATIONAL INTERPRETATION OF EXPRESSIONS.
Expressions and patterns induce distributions on bit-strings. These distributions are obtained by replacing data symbols with bit-strings and implementing encryption and key sharing with actual encryption and secret sharing schemes.
Formally, for any expression or pattern E, given a function f : Data → {0, 1} * that maps data symbols to bit-string representations of XML element names and values, an encryption scheme = (K, E, D), a secret sharing scheme SS = (S, C), and a security parameter η, we define the distribution
,SS f ) using a two-step procedure:
(1) In the first step, each key symbol is mapped to a bit-string. Specifically, we assume that keys(E) = {K 1 , . . . , K m }, and we generate a vector τ from the distribution K m+1 (η). This is a vector of m + 1 keys, each obtained by running the key generation algorithm on the security parameter. We map K i to τ [i] , and in particular map K 0 to τ [0] . We then obtain shares of the keys in τ by running the secret sharing scheme SS; these shares are maintained in an (m + 1)-by-n matrix φ whose rows are obtained by
(2) In the second step, we map each expression (or pattern) E to an interpretation
,SS,η f that we define inductively in Figure 3 . This step assumes constant bit-strings "or", "and", and "data", as well as a tupling operation on bitstrings. 
The computational interpretation [[E(P)]]
,SS,η f associated with the expression E(P) is the distribution of the partially encrypted document derived from protection P, generated with encryption scheme , secret sharing scheme SS, and η as security parameter.
Because encryption may not hide the length of plaintexts, we typically need hypotheses on the lengths of bit-string representations. For simplicity, we assume that those lengths depend only on structure. More precisely, we assume that the length of [[ E ]] ,SS,η f always equals the length of [[struct(E) 
]]
,SS,η f . In the case where E is a data symbol, this assumption implies that we focus on functions f : Data → {0, 1}
* that map data symbols to bit-strings of a fixed length:
Definition 2. A valuation is a function f : Data → {0, 1} * that maps every data symbol to a bit-string of the same length as data.
In the case where E is a key symbol, the assumption means that the key generator yields keys of a fixed length for each given security parameter. A similar condition applies to key shares. In the case where E is a tuple, it suffices that the length of a tuple be a function of the lengths of its components. Similarly, in the case where E is an encryption, it suffices that the length of a ciphertext be a function of the length of the underlying plaintext and of the security parameter. These conditions on keys, key shares, tuples, and encryptions hold in most usual implementations. 4.5. SECRECY, COMPUTATIONALLY. We use the concept of computational indistinguishability (≈) and the computational interpretation of expressions for giving a computational characterization for secrecy of data that occurs in expressions.
Definition 3. Let E be an expression, an encryption scheme, SS a secret sharing scheme, and S ⊆ Data. The set S is computationally hidden in E (with and SS) if for any two valuations f 0 and f 1 such that
As explained in the introduction, this definition indicates that an adversary is allowed to choose two interpretations for the data symbols in the expression E. These interpretations must map data that is not secret to the same bit-strings, but may map other data to different bit-strings of the same length. The adversary is then given a bit-string selected from the distribution determined by one of the two interpretations and its goal is to determine which interpretation was used. Secrecy means that the adversary cannot do much better than guessing. 4.6. MAIN RESULTS. The technical core of our results is the next theorem. It states that patterns faithfully represent the information that expressions reveal, even when expressions and patterns are mapped to bit-strings. Specifically, we prove that the distribution ensembles associated with E and pattern(E) are indistinguishable. THEOREM 2. Let E be an acyclic expression. If is an IND-CPA secure encryption scheme and SS is a secure secret sharing scheme, then, for any valuation f , it holds that This lemma follows from the definition of Acc E (T ) and Theorem 2.
Since Acc E (T ) consists of the data symbols that occur in the pattern of (E, K 1 , K 2 , . . . , K l ), we have that:
,SS f 1 for any two valuations f 0 and f 1 that coincide on Acc E (T ). We conclude by Theorem 2 and transitivity.
Going further, Theorem 4 relates the abstract semantics of a normalized protection P, as defined by the function Acc P (·), to the secrecy of data in the partially encrypted document associated with P. It requires that E(P) be acyclic, as we would expect for protections derived from policies (see Section 3). It states that if some data is secret according to the abstract semantics of protections, then that data is in fact computationally hidden. Therefore, we regard Theorem 4 as the main theorem of this article.
THEOREM 4. Let P be a normalized protection such that E(P) is an acyclic expression. Let T = {K 1 , K 2 , . . . , K l } ⊆ keys(E(P)) be an arbitrary set of keys. If is an IND-CPA secure encryption scheme and SS is a secure secret sharing scheme, then Data−Acc P (T ) is computationally hidden in (E(P), K 1 , K 2 , . . . , K l ) with and SS.
This theorem is an immediate corollary of Theorem 1 and Lemma 3.
CONSEQUENCES (DISCUSSION).
It is important to understand what our results imply, and also what they do not imply. Next we discuss some of their consequences. We focus this discussion on the expression of Figure 2 ,
which here we call E. Theorem 4 implies that if T = {K 1 , K 3 } and if f 0 and f 1 are two valuations that
,SS f 1 . The two valuations may differ on D 4 and D 6 . The theorem implies that no probabilistic polynomialtime adversary can get significant partial information on the values of D 4 and D 6 (beyond any information that it has a priori). In other words, the set {D 4 , D 6 } is computationally hidden in E, as one might have expected.
The valuations f 0 and f 1 are allowed to result in some (partial or total) coincidences in values. For instance, we may have
,SS f 1 despite these coincidences.
Thus, value repetitions are concealed. In terms of the protection of Figure 1 , the adversary cannot even tell whether the value of pat id of node 4 and the value of admin of node 6 are the same.
Since the valuations f 0 and f 1 are universally quantified, they may be chosen by the adversary. So, while the adversary obtains information about a document only by observing it, we allow for the possibility that the adversary may influence the contents of the document. This possibility seems realistic in many potential applications. For instance, in our particular example, the adversary may be the patient whose record is in node 4, and may therefore have some influence and prior knowledge on the contents of node 4.
On the other hand, the guarantees that the theorem offers are perhaps not as strong as some might expect, in particular with respect to document structure. For instance, the theorem does not exclude that an adversary might be able to distinguish a bit-string representation of E from a bit-string representation of the expression that we obtain from E by replacing D 6 with a non-atomic expression. Theorem 4 notwithstanding, an adversary may learn a great deal about the length and even the structure of encrypted material.
Unfortunately, this limitation of the theorem is not a shortcoming of our analysis, but rather the result of an intrinsic shortcoming in the technique that we are analyzing. Under the standard definition of security that we adopt for encryption, one cannot expect to do much better [Micciancio 2004 ,SS,η f may well have different lengths, so it is possible that their encryptions could be distinguished. The next section discusses stronger-but less standard-assumptions on encryption, and also other variants to our definitions.
Extensions
Alternative definitions are certainly possible, and perhaps attractive. In this section we consider some alternative definitions and corresponding extensions of our main results. We study additional security properties, addressing more stringent secrecy requirements and some more powerful attacks.
STRONGER SECRECY REQUIREMENTS FOR ENCRYPTION.
In particular, we may wish to require that a ciphertext encrypted under an unknown key reveal nothing about the underlying plaintext-not even its structure or its length [Abadi and Rogaway 2002] .
Formally, we may replace the functions p and pattern of Section 3. For instance, we may define replacements p and pattern as follows:
where is a special symbol that represents undecryptable material, and
The equation p ({E}
reflects the idea that encryption does not reveal anything about the encrypted plaintext. For instance, we have that
). An analogue of Theorem 1 holds with this definition. On the other hand, the other theorems of the paper are more problematic in this respect. In particular, an analogue of Theorem 2 does not hold. A stronger security requirement on encryption yields that analogue, and a corresponding strengthening of Theorem 4. That requirement is obtained from the definition of IND-CPA security by removing the restriction that the bit-strings m 0 and m 1 have equal length in queries (m 0 , m 1 ) to the left-right oracle.
Going further, in another formal variation we may replace p and pattern with the functions p and pattern defined as follows:
thus hiding the occurrence of the key K i when is produced, and
The equation p ({E} K i , T ) = (for K i ∈ T ) implies that an adversary that does not know the encryption key K i a priori cannot identify the use of K i . For instance, we have that pattern (({D
this equation indicates that an adversary cannot tell whether the two pieces of data D 1 and D 2 are protected by the same key. Such guarantees might matter in settings where the security policy itself is sensitive information. They do not hold with IND-CPA security, so they do not follow from Theorem 4. Again, we need a strengthening of IND-CPA security, such as type-0 security [Abadi and Rogaway 2002] .
For brevity, we omit precise statements and proofs of the analogues of Theorems 2 and 4 for pattern and pattern .
ATTACKS WITH MULTIPLE QUERIES. Definition 3 is concerned with an
adversary that attempts to recover secret information from a single document. In this section, we consider more general settings in which the adversary attempts to extract information from several related documents.
As a motivating scenario, let us consider an electronic journal that offers several types of possible subscriptions. Each type enables access to a selection of journal sections. The access policy can be enforced by means of a protection: articles (and groups of articles) are encrypted and each subscriber receives an appropriate set of decryption keys. Some aspects of this scenario do not seem to be adequately captured by Definition 3. In this scenario, an adversary may have access to several related documents (several issues of the journal), and may influence the contents of one document on the basis of the contents of past ones (for instance, by publishing articles in the journal). User dynamics (new subscriptions and cancelled subscriptions) can cause further complications.
Next we give stronger security definitions, with such scenarios in mind. Then we prove strengthenings of results of Section 4. These strengthenings do not require additional cryptographic hypotheses, and yield security guarantees with respect to more general, more active adversaries.
For our definitions, we introduce an oracle that enables an adversary to request encrypted versions of documents of its choosing. Formally, we let EKG(η) generate vectors of keys and key shares for security parameter η, and we write [[ E ]] , SS,η φ,τ, f b for the result of the procedure defined in Figure 3 for fixed τ and φ; then for expression E, encryption scheme , secret sharing scheme SS, and set S ⊆ Data, and for any (τ, φ) . Thus, the oracle O uses a fixed pair (τ, φ); our results have analogues for the case in which O generates a fresh pair (τ, φ) at each query. The oracle O also uses a fixed expression E; we have yet to study the case in which E may vary under control of the adversary.
Definition 4 is a variant of Definition 3 in which an adversary has access to such an oracle O: Definition 4. Let E be an expression, an encryption scheme, SS a secret sharing scheme, and S ⊆ Data. The set S is computationally hidden in E (with and SS) against multi-query adversaries if for any probabilistic polynomial-time adversary A the function 
The proof of this theorem resembles that of Theorem 2, and it is presented in the appendix.
Using this theorem, we obtain the following result, which relates symbolic secrecy and secrecy with respect to multi-query adversaries. In order to prove this theorem, we consider a multi-query adversary A, we let S be the set Data − Acc E (T ) and let E be the expression (E, K 1 , K 2 , . . . , K l ), and we aim to show that Adv 
LEMMA 6. Let E be an acyclic expression and T = {K
(Here, the probabilities are over the choice (τ, φ) R ← EKG(η), the coins of adversaries, and those of oracles; for brevity, we omit (τ, φ) R ← EKG(η) from formulas below.) We obtain:
By Theorem 5, the first and the last summands are negligible. The middle summand is 0 because A's queries ( f 0 , f 1 ) consist of valuations that coincide on the set Acc E (T ), and (by the definition of Acc E (T )) these are the only symbols that occur in pattern(E ). We conclude that Adv dist-m ,SS,E ,S (A, η) is negligible. Finally, Theorem 1 and Lemma 6 immediately yield the following analogue of Theorem 4: THEOREM 7. Let P be a normalized protection such that E(P) is an acyclic expression. Let T = {K 1 , K 2 , . . . , K l } ⊆ keys(E(P)) be an arbitrary set of keys. If is an IND-CPA secure encryption scheme and SS is a secure secret sharing scheme, then Data−Acc P (T ) is computationally hidden in (E(P), K 1 , K 2 , . . . , K l ) with and SS against multi-query adversaries.
ATTACKS WITH SELECTIVE DECRYPTION.
We close this section with a brief discussion of security under selective decryption attacks (SD-security for short) [Canetti et al. 1996] . Consider an attacker that receives a set of ciphertexts and then chooses a subset to be decrypted; the choice may depend on the ciphertexts received. The problem addressed by research on SD-security is to show that the remaining, undecrypted plaintexts are still protected.
Generally, formal methods do not give special consideration to selective decryption attacks; basically, selective decryption is not regarded as any more harmful than any other decryption, and it need not endanger undecrypted plaintexts. On the other hand, from a computational perspective, research on selective decommitment [Dwork et al. 2003 ] (a closely related subject) would suggest that proving the existence of SD-secure encryption schemes would require the development of new cryptographic techniques.
This particular discrepancy between formal and computational views need not be an immediate concern in the present setting, since it need not present the selective decryption problem in full generality. Specifically, in Section 4, the set of encryptions available to an adversary in a single document depends only on the document, and is independent of the security parameter. Under analogous conditions, it is possible to show that standard security implies SD-security for commitment schemes [Dwork et al. 2003 ], and the proof may well extend to encryption schemes. For more general adversaries (such as multi-query adversaries), other solutions should be sought. One possibility may be to explore noncommitting encryption [Canetti et al. 1996] , as in the setting of multi-party computation. Unfortunately, at present, non-committing encryption can be quite inefficient.
Conclusion
The main contribution of this article is a precise justification of the encryptionbased techniques for enforcing access policies for XML documents, as developed by Miklau and Suciu. More specifically, we provide a proof that XML data that is secret according to an abstract, symbolic semantics is indeed secret with respect to a strong, computational notion of security.
In defining the subject of our analysis, we have attempted to be faithful to the work of Miklau and Suciu. In further research, one might like to depart from their framework. In particular, like them, we have focused on protection against offline attacks. In such attacks, the adversary obtains information about a document only by observing it. However, we have allowed for some interaction with the adversary, enabling the adversary to influence the contents of documents; in further research, it may be interesting to consider more general active attacks. It may also be interesting to consider richer access control policies, including integrity requirements, as well as richer data models with key constraints, functional dependencies, and other refinements. The value of rigorous analysis may be even larger with these enrichments, but our basic approach should remain applicable and helpful in bridging the gap between high-level designs and precise guarantees.
Appendixes
A. Proof of Theorem 2
In this appendix, we provide a proof of Theorem 2. Some aspects of the proof are by now standard; the reader may wish to consult the proof of the main theorem in the work of Abadi and Rogaway [2002] . We start with some notation and useful lemmas.
A permutation σ : Keys ∪ KeyShares → Keys ∪ KeyShares is consistent if -σ (K i ) ∈ Keys for all K i ∈ Keys, and
For any consistent permutation σ , we write Eσ for the expression obtained from E by renaming its keys and key shares according to σ . Consistent renamings do not change the distribution ensembles associated with expressions:
LEMMA 8. For any expression E, if σ is a consistent permutation, then:
This lemma holds because the output of the algorithm that associates a distribution with an expression does not depend on the actual atomic symbols used in the expression, but only on their meaning.
For each expression and pattern E, we write hidden(E) for the set of keys that are not recoverable from E:
The following lemma states that the keys in any acyclic expression E can be reordered so that the first l keys are the keys hidden in E and the remaining keys are the keys that can be recovered from E. Moreover, it is possible to reorder the keys so that, in the resulting expression, for any two hidden keys K i and K j , if K i encrypts K j then i < j.
LEMMA 9. If E is an acyclic expression, m = |keys(E)|, and l = |hidden(E)|, then there exists a consistent permutation σ such that: -keys(Eσ
By Lemmas 8 and 9, it is sufficient to prove the theorem under the following additional assumptions:
PROOF OF THE THEOREM. We prove the theorem by a hybrid argument: given an expression E as above, we exhibit a series of distribution ensembles
,SS f , and
Since l is a fixed constant (independent of the security parameter), the conclusion of the theorem immediately follows. Consider the sequence of patterns E 0 , E 1 , . . . , E l inductively defined by: 
,SS f . Also, since pattern E l is obtained by replacing all subexpressions of E of the form {E } K i for some K i ∈ hidden(E) with {struct(E )} K i , we have that E l = pattern(E) and, therefore, that 
, and we can conclude that
Consider the patterns E i,0 and E i,1 defined as follows: 
We use the bit-strings contained in φ[m + 1] as interpretations of the symbols K 1 , K 2 , . . . , K n , so we add to the algorithm in Figure 3 the line:
For each 0 ≤ i ≤ l −1, we let D i,0 and D i,1 be the distribution ensembles associated with E i,0 and E i,1 .
The remainder of the proof consists of three steps. They respective establish that
Step 1 (D i ≈ D i,0 ). The proof is by reduction. Given an index 0 ≤ h ≤ l − 1 and an algorithm A such that Adv
is non-negligible, we construct an adversary B against SS such that Adv ss SS (B, η) is also non-negligible. Therefore, the scheme SS is not a secure secret sharing scheme.
In the construction of B, we use the set 
It follows that if the advantage of A is non-negligible then so is that of B.
Adversary B computes s by applying to E h a variant of the algorithm given in Section 4 for mapping expressions to bit-strings. Specifically, B starts by generating the vector τ of keys in which the entries τ [h + 1] and τ [m + 1] are set to k 0 and k 1 . Next, B computes the entries in the matrix φ (used for defining the semantics of the key shares that occur in E h ). Both τ and φ have the appropriate distributions since k 0 and k 1 are randomly generated keys.
Then, B computes the string s by recursively associating bit-strings with the subexpressions of E h . The only departure from the algorithm of Section 4 is as follows. The bit-strings associated with the shares of K h+1 are interpreted using the input to B. (In the original algorithm, the bit-string interpretation of these shares are the entries in Step 2 with non-negligible probability, we construct an adversary B against such that Adv ind-cpa (B, η) is also non-negligible. The adversary B has access to the oracle LR ,b and constructs a bit-string s that is sampled according to the distribution D h,b . Then B invokes algorithm A on input s and outputs whatever A outputs. We thus obtain:
. It follows that if the advantage of A is non-negligible then so is that of B. Therefore, the scheme is not an IND-CPA secure encryption scheme. Adversary B computes s by applying to E h,0 a variant of the algorithm given in Section 4. Specifically, B generates the vector of keys τ and the matrix of key shares φ and then recursively maps each subexpression F of E h,0 to a bitstring. The interpretations of all basic symbols with the exception of the key K h+1 are as in Section 4. The interpretation of K h+1 is set to k, the key of the oracle. Since B does not actually have k, it is crucial that no share of K h+1 occurs in E h,0 . By acyclicity, there are no plain occurrences of K h+1 in E h,0 either. There may however be uses of K h+1 as an encryption key. In order to deal with those occurrences, B makes uses of the oracle for producing encryptions under k, as follows.
Suppose that E h,0 has a subexpression F of the form {E } K h+1 . First, B samples strings m 0 and m 1 from the distributions associated with E and struct(E ), respectively. This task is mostly straightforward since B knows the interpretations of all symbols that occur in E and struct(E ) with the exception of the interpretation of K h+1 . Whenever B needs to compute an encryption of a plaintext m under the key k (which is the interpretation of K h+1 ), B submits to the oracle the pair (m, m) and obtains in return one such encryption. After producing m 0 and m 1 as described above, B submits to the oracle the pair (m 0 , m 1 ) and sets c to be the answer returned by the oracle. Therefore, if the selection bit of the oracle is 0, then c is an encryption of m 0 under k, so c is distributed according to [[{E } K h+1 
. If the selection bit of the oracle is 1, then c is an encryption of m 1 under k, so c is distributed according to [[{struct(E ) ,SS,η , respectively, and therefore have equal lengths (by the assumption on the implementation discussed in Section 4).
Step 
B. Proof of Theorem 5
Since Theorem 5 is an extension of Theorem 2, the two proofs have the same structure, and they share many ideas. While Theorem 2 could be obtained as a corollary of Theorem 5, we prefer to present its proof separately, for clarity, and then to omit a few common details in the following proof of Theorem 5.
PROOF OF THE THEOREM. By Lemmas 8 and 9, it is sufficient to prove the theorem under the additional assumptions that:
We define a series of oracles,
(1) the behaviors of oracles O 0 (τ, φ, η) and O (E, , SS, τ, φ, η) 
is negligible.
The conclusion of the theorem follows since:
Since the sum of a constant number of negligible functions is negligible, we conclude that Adv dist-pat ,SS,E (A, η) is negligible, as desired. Consider the sequence of patterns E 0 , E 1 , . . . , E l inductively defined as in the proof of Theorem 2. For 0 ≤ i ≤ l, we let O i be O (E i , , SS, τ, φ, η) . By construction, E 0 = E and E l = pattern(E), so conditions 1 and 2 above are clearly satisfied.
The next step is to show that, for any probabilistic-polynomial time adversary A, the function Adv SS, τ, φ, η) and let O i,1 (τ, φ, η) be O (E i, 1 , , SS, τ, φ, η) , where E i,0 and E i,1 are as in the proof of Theorem 2. We prove that, for 0 ≤ i ≤ l − 1 and any probabilistic polynomial-time adversary A, the functions:
are all negligible, so
is also negligible, as desired. Each of these functions is treated in an argument analogous to one of Steps 1, 2, and 3 in the proof of Theorem 2.
Step 1 (Adv
The proof is by reduction. Given an index 0 ≤ h ≤ l − 1 and an algorithm A such that Adv
(A, η) is non-negligible, we construct an adversary B against SS so that Adv ss SS (B, η) is also non-negligible. We let S h be the set of indexes for the shares of K h+1 that occur in E h , as in the proof of Theorem 2. Since adversary B is against the secret sharing scheme, it receives as input two keys ,SS,η τ,φ, f (in the latter case). Furthermore, whenever A outputs 1, B outputs 1. We therefore obtain that: In order to answer a query f from A, B computes a string s by recursively associating a bit-string with the subexpressions of E h . The difference from the algorithm of Section 4 is that the shares of K h+1 are interpreted using the input to B. These shares are shares of either τ [h + 1] or τ [m + 1].
Next, we reason as in Step 1 of the proof of Theorem 2. If (s 1 , s 2 , . . . , s t ) is sampled according to S(k 0 , η)| S h , then key K h+1 is mapped to k 0 and its shares to appropriate shares of k 0 , so the string s is sampled according to [[ E h ]] ,SS,η τ,φ, f . The rest of A's queries are answered using the values (τ, φ) generated at the beginning of B's execution. We conclude that, in this case, A's view is as in its interaction with oracle O (E h , , SS, τ, φ, η) . Similarly, if (s 1 , s 2 , . . . , s t ) is sampled according to S(k 1 , η)| S h , then K h+1 is mapped to k 0 and its shares are mapped to corresponding shares of k 1 (that is, shares of τ [m + 1]). Therefore, s is sampled according to [[ E h,0 
,SS,η τ,φ, f , and thus A's view is as in its interaction with oracle O (E h, 0 , , SS, τ, φ, η) .
Step 2 (Adv is non-negligible we construct an adversary B so that Adv ind-cpa (B, η) is also nonnegligible. Since adversary B is against encryption scheme , it has access to a left-right oracle LR ,b (η).
The idea behind the construction of B is to execute A as a subroutine in such a way that A's view is as in interaction with oracle O (E h,b , , SS, τ, φ, η) First, B generates a vector τ of keys for encryption and the matrix φ of corresponding key shares. The key τ [h + 1] is set to be the key k of B's left-right oracle. Crucially, B does not actually need to know k: the shares of K h+1 do not occur in E h,0 (by construction of E h,0 ), and K h+1 itself occurs only as an encryption key. The corresponding encryptions are computed by B's oracle.
In order to answer a query f from A, B recursively maps each subexpression F of E h,0 to a bit-string. As in the algorithm described in Section 4, basic symbols are mapped to bit-strings. The interesting case is that of subexpressions where K h+1 occurs. As explained above, these expressions contain K h+1 only as encryption key and B deals with this case by using its left-right oracle.
Specifically, the string associated to subexpression {E } K h+1 is computed as follows. First, B samples two strings m 0 and m 1 from the distributions associated to E and struct(E ). As explained in the proof of Theorem 2, this process is rather straightforward. Then B submits to its oracle the pair (m 0 , m 1 ) and obtains in return some bit-string c. The string associated with {E } K h+1 is set to c. The distribution of c depends on the bit b of the left-right oracle. When b = 0, string c is an encryption of m 0 under k, and is therefore sampled according to distribution [[{E } K h+1 ]]
,SS,η τ,φ, f . Otherwise (i.e., when b = 1), string c is an encryption of m 1 under k, and is therefore sampled according to distribution [[{struct(E ) 
,SS,η τ,φ, f . Since E h,1 is obtained from E h,0 by replacing all subterms of the form {E } K h+1 with {struct(E )} K h+1 , it follows that the string s obtained at the end of the procedure satisfies the desired condition, that is, it is sampled according to [[ E h,b 
,SS,η τ,φ, f . In the rest of the execution, B answers A's queries following the procedure described above, and using (τ, φ) generated at the beginning of its execution. We conclude that A's view is as in its interaction with oracle O (E h,b , , SS, τ, φ, η) , as desired.
Step 3 (Adv
(η) is negligible). This step is similar to Step 1: Expression E i,1 may be obtained from expression E i+1 by replacing each share K i h+1 of K h+1 with share K i of a fresh key K , that is, in precisely the same manner in which E i,0 is obtained from E i . The same proof method applies.
